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Theory and Experiment: What are the questions? 
 
 
…“when we praise any actions, we regard only the 
motives that produced them, and consider the actions as 
signs or indications of certain principles in the mind or 
temper…We look within to find the moral 
quality…(but) we cannot do this directly…When we 
require an action, or blame a person for not performing 
it…we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. If 
we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still 
powerful…tho’ checked in its operation by some 
circumstances unknown to us, we retract out blame, 
…(Hume, 1739; 1985, pp 529-30)  
  
1.  Introduction. 
 
In this passage, I see Hume reminding us that action is 
produced by motive only in conjunction with other circumstances 
of action, and we cannot infer motive, or any mediating condition, 
from action alone. Mindfully, we all know that the statements we 
test with observations are of the form: If H(M), where H(M) is a 
hypothesis concerning motive, and given the decision 
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circumstances, C, then action A follows from the conjunction of 
H(M) and C, and not the reverse; i. e., we cannot conclude 
anything about the implications of A for H(M) independently of C. 
But we cannot be continuously mindful in all that we do. In 
constructing formal theory we try carefully to avoid confusing if-
then with if-and-only-if, statements, but when we leave our closet, 
we easily slip casually into this confusion, theorists and 
experimentalists alike. Moreover, human motivation may be so 
inextricably bound up with circumstances that embody previous 
experience that it is not even meaningful to separate them.1 
 This paper deals generally with testing questions that arise 
both when experimental observations are in accord with the actions 
we predict, and when they are not. In both cases the inference of 
truth from observation is inherently ambiguous, and we face the 
daunting challenge of using our experimental skills and 
imagination to reduce this ambiguity. Primarily and most difficult 
of all we have to constantly reevaluate everything, including 
ourselves, especially in examining how we talk about and interpret 
our data, and, in certain sensitive experiments, how we 
communicate word descriptions to our subjects and solicit the 
                                                 
1 In elaborating on my interpretation and use of this quotation from Hume, Bart Wilson reminds me that 
Wittgenstein would ground motive in action, “not by identifying an inner motive but through…actions as 
woven into our ‘form of life.’ ” (Personal correspondence, 14 Feb 2007). 
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same from them.2 Although I will be drawing on examples and 
experience from laboratory experiments, the issues I consider 
apply just as meaningfully to other empirical studies whether from 
field experiments or observations from past records of 
socioeconomic processes.  
My purpose is to promote a discussion that probes more 
deeply into the implicit, often hidden, multiplicity of mediating 
conditions or auxiliary hypotheses on which we rely in order to 
extract meaning from tests of formal hypotheses. The exercise is 
difficult because I must necessarily go beyond the words we 
usually find adequate in our discourses. Hence, the paper’s style is 
to raise questions, without any presumption that many of the 
answers are within the range of data now available.       
 
2.  Why so many experiments on seemingly narrow topics? 
 
The answer is simply stated: we want to reduce error and to 
understand its sources. ‘Error’ is defined as a discrepancy between 
what we observe and what we expect as an implication of our 
predictive hypotheses; i.e., it includes specification error in all its 
forms as well as sampling error. This discrepancy depends upon 
factors that arise as part of the testing process or from the 
                                                 
2 As will be evident below, I am thinking of two-person games (ultimatum, dictator, trust), and the many 
variations on VCM games.    
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hypothesis generating methods, or both.3  Predictive hypotheses, as 
expectations about observations, are sometimes inspired initially 
and directly from a theoretical model. I choose the word “inspired” 
rather than the word “derived” advisedly; this is because of the 
large reservoir of personal experiential knowledge that we must 
draw on in order to make operational a test of any theoretical 
construct with empirical observations. That knowledge is always 
subject to revision in the light of new direct examinations.  
In exploring error it is important to probe beyond the 
restricted confines of the original theory and examine the 
assumptions we make in interpreting test outcomes. This is 
because testing involves a blizzard of narrowly prescribed 
circumstances that are not part of the theory. Error may be 
dependent on those circumstances, and patterns in such 
dependence may harbor clues to a more comprehensive 
understanding of behavior than can be gleaned within the restricted 
framework of reasoning within the theory.       
An intensively studied case where predictions fail is the 
dictator game, originally motivated by the conjecture that 
rejections in the ultimatum game—where predictions also failed—
were due to “fairness,” meaning, I believe it was thought, a 
culturally derived social standard for sharing a fungible resource 
                                                 
3 When we do test bedding exercises in Economic System Design, ‘error’ is any observed gap between 
design objectives and observations. Thus our objectives are typically maximum efficiency, reduced 
decision or transactions cost, simplicity of operations, and so on.   
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(money) under specified but singularly unfamiliar (see the 
discussion below) choice rules.4 5 Thus Forsythe et al (1994) 
reasoned that if “fairness” fully accounts for the ultimatum results 
then removing the responder’s veto power should make no 
difference. We learned that it made a big difference, but the 
dictator game took on a special life of its own because scholars—
conditioned to expect domination—were puzzled as to why 80% of 
the dictators were giving positive if modest amounts of money to 
anonymous persons.  
Similarly, many important questions remain when the theory 
accounts for observations, and predictive error is ostensibly low, 
but we seek to understand the theory’s success:  
                                                 
4 Thus, in Wierzbicka (2006) we have: “The ubiquity of the words fair and unfair in modern English 
discourse, across a wide range of registers, is all the more remarkable given that these words have no 
equivalents in other European languages  (let alone non-European ones) and are thoroughly untranslatable 
(p 141)…the everyday word fair has crystallized in its meaning political and philosophical ideas that were 
developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth century by the thinkers of the British Enlightenment and that 
have become entrenched in modern Anglo consciousness (p 152)…there are indeed some universal moral 
norms and values, but to think that ‘fairness’ is among them is an Anglo centric illusion (p 162)…The 
earliest examples that sound ‘modern’ in their use of fair are those with the phrase fair play…(that) had its 
opposite in foul play, not in unfair play (p 164)…team sport…provides a perfect model for ‘fair’ interaction 
because the emphasis is on rules and procedures, which are blind to the individual players interests and 
which everyone voluntarily accepts (p 166)…The concept of ‘fairness’ is an artifact of modern Anglo 
culture and one of the key concepts that speakers of Anglo English live with and see as the best basis for 
social life and interpersonal interaction (p 166).” If subjects use the colloquial unfair in reference to their 
experience in an ultimatum or dictator game does this reflect the rules, the outcomes, the outcomes under 
the rules, or other circumstances such as that the experimenter is staking the game? It might be that in these 
games people really have in mind justice not fairness, since there is incomplete overlap between English 
and other languages in the translation of the former, and the former is about substantive outcomes not 
procedure. The standard forms of justice (distributive, corrective, retributive, commutative) all concern the 
result, not the procedures that arrive at the result. Wierzbicka (2006, p 165) Experimenters use fair in the 
substantive utilitarian sense but our only clues as to what the subjects mean is through explorations of how 
the circumstances (context) of decision affect behavior.       
5 For a summary of experiments that probe issues related to the “fairness” interpretation of ultimatum game 
behavior, see Schmitt (2003) 
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How are decision makers who have not the academic 
knowledge of either the theorist or the experimentalist able to 
approximate the predictions of the theory?  
Do they think about the problem the way we do?  
If not, why do we observe the predicted outcome? 
I will turn first to a celebrated case in which theory has 
seemed to be predictive.  
  
       3.  When theory passes our tests, what are the questions - 
the double auction example? 
 
Static competitive market equilibrium theory has performed 
well under double auction (DA) rules, and this is often touted as a 
victory for theory. It was indeed a remarkable and surprising 
discovery, but the theory failed to predict the weak conditions 
under which these outcomes would prevail.6 The participants in 
these experimental markets need only private information and 
moderate repetition; they do not require sophistication or deep 
experience, except in certain very complex multiple commodity 
and network market environments; nor must they have an 
understanding of economics. In fact knowledge of economics does 
                                                 
6 Financial asset trading environments based on rational expectations (fundamental value) theory 
using DA rules provide an exception to these findings in the sense that convergence is by comparison very 
slow. (Smith et al, 1988; Porter and Smith, 1994). I return to this topic below in discussing the issue of 
subject “confusion.”   
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not appear to carry an advantage for the typical experimental DA 
participant.  
Moreover, these documented results are robust in that they 
extend to different subject pools, to quite complex multiple market 
supply and demand environments, and in a qualified sense to other 
trading institutions.   
Subjects: Hundreds, probably thousands of experiments by 
now have demonstrated robustness over an incredible range of 
people—with students at all levels, business persons (including 
regulated utility managers), government officials (including 
regulators), citizens of Russia and China, and academic 
professionals including game theorists.7  
Complexity: Starting in the 1980s, new tests in multiple 
interdependent markets induced Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) values on two commodities. A CES payoff function together 
with a budget constraint implies that the price an individual is 
expected to pay for commodity A depends on the price of B and 
vice versa. But this statement only has meaning contingent on the 
prices (and therefore knowledge of how the budget limits choice) 
being known in advance, whereas the DA trading task is for a 
                                                 
7 At a conference of leading international theorists, the group was about to participate in an oral double 
auction price discovery experiment. After passing out the values and costs to the buyers and sellers and 
describing the rules, a leading game theorist raised his hand, and asked, “How can I make a decision—I do 
not have enough information.” Answer: “Don’t worry you will be able to handle this,” as indeed he did, but 
there is a puzzle as to the processes whereby our brains have this and other skills so deeply hidden from our 
calculating self-aware minds.  
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group of buyers and sellers to discover the equilibrium prices and 
corresponding trading volumes that satisfy the static individual 
budget constraints that emerge out of that process. Sixteen 
replications yielded DA convergence in only a few more 
repetitions than in isolated single commodity markets.8 But 
modeling any such dynamic adjustment process has tended to 
exceed the bounded rationality of economic theorists.9  
Institutions: Sealed bid-offer call markets and posted offer 
markets have been compared with DA across identical single 
commodity environments. (Smith et al, 1982; Ketcham et al 1984) 
With some exceptions, these alternatives to DA also converge to 
the market clearing equilibrium, although DA tends to converge 
more rapidly and consistently to efficient allocation levels. (See the 
discussion and references in Davis and Holt, 1993)      
The challenge of the DA empirical results has not yielded 
game theoretic models that predict convergence to a static 
competitive equilibrium. This failure is not for a lack of effort.  R. 
Wilson (1987), one of the best theorists in the business, modeled 
DA trading with the standard assumptions of what is common 
knowledge—number of agents, their distribution of values, 
capacity to compute the equilibrium, etc. The model itself 
                                                 
8 Williams et al (1986, 2000); also see the convergence results reported in Smith, 1991 and Plott 2001.  
9 Except see the significant early contribution of Reiter (1959, 1981); also, the intriguing recent results in  
Gjerstad  (2007) who reports experiments that use the DA to implement the Hahn-Negishi  
adjustment process, a theoretical model which allows for disequilibrium trades.   
Page 9 of 55
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 9
generates degeneracy in the end game. He acknowledges that we 
have a tool problem: “The crucial deficiencies, however, are 
inescapable consequences of the game theoretic formulation.” 
(Wilson, 1987, 411) We appear to be up against the ultimate 
limitations of the complete information common knowledge game 
theoretic model. We have encountered a dead end. We cannot 
model and predict what our subjects can routinely accomplish 
without complete information, and in some examples with 
complete information convergence is worse than under incomplete 
(private) information. Friedman (1984) is more successful, using 
an unconventional no-congestion assumption to finesse the usual 
problems, concluding efficiency and a final clearing price but the 
theory does not yield testable predictions about the dynamics of 
convergence.  
4. When theory fails our tests, what premises might we 
question?  
The short answer is that any combination of the assumptions 
of the theory and its implementation in the experiment may be 
among the culprits. Some good examples arise in two-person game 
theory: under the procedures commonly used and interpreted, the 
theory has not fared well in tests of ultimatum, dictator, 
investment, and trust games. The eight item list I will consider 
includes some of the formal axioms of game theory as well as 
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some of the common assumptions that experimentalists make in 
order to construct and implement tests. 
4.1. Backward Induction 
Assumption 1. A basic formal postulate is that People 
will use backward induction to analyze their situation, 
to determine the consequences of one’s own and the 
choices of others, and to choose accordingly.  
In effect, we have assumed that subjects’ behavior is 
equivalent to having had the course and mastered the principles; 
they think like game theorists and the way we experimentalists 
think in constructing tests.  
I will discuss several examples of empirical challenges to this 
assumption: 
In ultimatum games (framed as a bilateral trade), subjects 
offer more under instructional treatments in which the proposer is 
asked to “consider what choice you expect the buyer to 
make…(also) consider what you think the buyer expects you to 
choose.” Presumably, if people are already applying backward 
induction this instruction should make no difference. (Hoffman et 
al, 2000). We were surprised by the outcome—proposers offered 
more—and we explored it more completely than we had originally 
planned or expected. We thought the slight modification in the 
instructions was a benign means of encouraging thoughtfulness; 
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What was our error? We interpreted the data from the perspective 
of game theory, which is not the perspective of the subjects—
remind them to think ahead like a game theorist and they appear to 
focus on socially derived circumstances (what do you and other 
expect?). Hence, we seem to encounter heightened concern about 
the possibility of implicit disagreement if the offer is too low. 
(Wilson, 2007 offers this interpretation). This is one of the many 
ways in which our learning can be occasioned by varying 
instructions and procedures. Experimenters who conduct these 
exercises routinely encounter surprises and it behooves us to ask 
after their implications for changing how we interpret 
observations. A procedure used to test a theory that leads to correct 
predictions is not “right,” nor is one that leads to incorrect 
predictions, “wrong.” Rather, we need to ask what the totality of 
this evidence tells us about the maintained (auxiliary) assumptions 
of theory and its test framework.         
In asset trading, I and my coauthors conjectured that price 
bubbles were a consequence of some subjects having home grown 
expectations of prices rising and on that supposition “reasoning” as 
follows: capital gains can be earned by buying shares in 
expectation of reselling them at a higher price and similarly by 
selling shares in anticipation of buying them back at a lower price. 
(Smith et al, 1988).  The proposition is falsified by the following 
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procedure: Endow some subjects with cash and the right to buy 
shares to hold against dividend payments. They cannot, however, 
resell for cash. Endow others with the right to hold shares for 
dividends or sell shares against cash but they cannot repurchase 
any shares sold. Hence, if bubbles arise because subjects are 
mindfully expectant of an increase in prices they cannot profit 
from this expectation, and likewise if they expect prices to decline. 
The important implication is that no profit motivated trader 
reasoning as above will sell at prices below or buy at prices above 
the fundamental value. But Lei et al (2001) apply these procedures, 
and report that bubbles can be observed much as in experiments in 
which these restrictions are not applied to trading behavior. Their 
results imply that our original interpretation of subject thought 
processes and actions were not correct because we had slipped into 
thinking that—given expectations of rising prices—the subjects 
reason like economists.  
These results are sometimes interpreted to mean that the 
subjects are “confused.” Notice, however, that this means that they 
are “confused” in the sense of failing to reason about asset trading 
the way we do as economists, by applying backward induction 
based on given expectations. That is, we have erred in believing 
they would think as we expected.  The tests tell us what subjects do 
not do, but they help not at all in understanding how subjects think 
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and why they do what they do. Moreover, the results do not 
explain why subjects commonly converge to intrinsic equilibrium 
value after becoming twice previously experienced. Groups 
ranging from business persons to stock traders to high schools 
students are all equally “confused.” Subjects do not routinely apply 
reason to the tasks we give them the same way we do in our 
constructivist models. This seems to be true both when they 
achieve our predicted outcomes and when they do not. Is not our 
task to understand behavior? Imagine either Franz de Waal or Jane 
Goodall concluding from their studies that their Chimp subjects are 
“confused.” Even so Goodall and de Waal are criticized for 
“anthropomorphizing” their subjects.10  
You might say that we “anthropo-theorize” our subjects. 
Similar findings have been reported in VCM games where 
the standard observation is that subjects start by contributing 
unexpectedly large amounts to the public good then reduce them 
over successive periods. This has been explained by the conjecture 
that subjects give in anticipation that others will subsequently 
reciprocate their early giving, but when this expectation fails to be 
fulfilled they become disheartened and reduce their contributions.  
                                                 
10 This is why “…it has not been clear that being an economic agent has had any advantages in the 
scientific study of economic behavior.”  (Smith, 1991, p 259) Economists, as economic agents, do not have 
access to the unconscious mental processes that govern their own behavior in market and other social 
exchange processes. Can you model your own real time behavior in a DA experiment?   
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Houser and Kurzban (2002, hereafter HK; also see Andrioni, 
1995) compare contributions in two treatment conditions: one 
consisting of a collective of four persons; the other consisting of 
one person and three computer “players” or robots. Individual 
subjects in the latter condition were instructed that the 
contributions of the computer players were fixed independently of 
their individual contributions; moreover, in this condition on each 
round of play, the humans were reminded that “This period, 
regardless of what you do, the computers will contribute ___....” 
(HK, p 1068). HK find that (1) “Confusion,” in the sense of error 
in which individuals fail to act rationally on the implications of the 
instructions, was responsible for approximately half of all alleged 
“cooperation” in VCM experiments. (2) All of the decay over time 
in the level of contributions was attributed to reductions in 
“confusion.” Subjects give to the public good although they cannot 
reap any possible future benefit and currently are giving up money 
by not allocating all of their endowment to the private good. In 
repetition many subjects appear simply to be learning by 
experience the implications of what was stated in the instructions, 
viz., that individual payoffs from the public good depend only on 
total giving not on whether the individual contributed to that total. 
Implicit in this discovery is the hazard we face as experimentalists 
in drawing inferences from single play observations in which 
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subjects have no opportunity to adjust decisions in real time based 
on experience, and we have to rely on how subjects apply reason to 
their task.  
Again, these results tell us what the subjects do not do, and 
we remain uniformed about what mental processes underpin their 
behavior. Many subjects do not “get the message” that we thought 
should be transparent in the initial verbal information. I suggest 
that their brains’ require the real time feed back of experiential 
reinforcement—the hypothesis is that people learn primarily by 
doing, or observing others doing, not by deliberation and abstract 
analysis applied to their task description.   
 Finally, Johnson et al (2002) using “look ahead mouse lab” 
technology report that in three-stage declining pie alternating offer 
games 19% of the subjects fail to look ahead to the next stage. 
When playing robots the subjects frequently rejected equilibrium 
offers. This is consistent with the hypothesis—as in HK—that the 
“mouse lab” subjects do not apply what we would regard as the 
most elementary backward induction and economic reasoning 
when analyzing the consequences of their choices.11 Johnson et al 
(2002, see footnote 11) cite many examples in which people fail to 
                                                 
11 Also see Herz (2007) who examines the “mouse lab” acquisition of information in a “partners” vs 
“opponents” trust game whose structure is like that studied by Burnham et al (2000), but simplified to 
enable greater focus on information processing. Among the many interesting results reported are the 
observations that “partners” open significantly more payoff boxes, and spend significantly more looking 
time (double) at boxes than “opponents.” These and other observations, such as “partners” reopening more 
boxes than “opponents,” are consistent with the hypothesis that “partners” are engaged in explorations that 
show a greater orientation toward relationship building within the single sequential play than “opponents.”        
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use backward induction; through repeat experience, however, 
subjects can be induced to behave in accordance with the 
implications of backward induction. This does not imply that they 
generalize that learning to other situations as a problem solving 
principle.  
Earlier, a significant study by Harrison and McCabe (1992) 
reported convergence toward equilibrium in alternating offer, 
declining pie, game experiments in which subjects repeatedly 
obtained experience with the future sub games before playing the 
full game. Subjects needed to experience the future to take it 
properly into account, which suggests that people may “induct 
forward,” in the sense of choosing, then modifying their choice in 
repetitions when the outcomes turn out to be unsatisfying to them. 
They arrive at their play choices by adaptation and experience over 
time, not by reasoning ahead and taking account of both own and 
other choices. This finding is particularly interesting since an 
important function of futures markets—or so we have 
discovered—is to serve in enabling people to internalize a reading 
on each other’s expectation of a future event by making a current 
market in claims contingent on that future event. Thus, futures 
markets have been found to moderate laboratory stock market 
bubbles.12 In this case futures’ trading is an example of a market 
                                                 
12 See Porter and Smith (1995) and Noussair and Tucker (2006).  
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institution that serves to facilitate looking ahead, obtaining 
information and performing backward induction for individuals. 
This market helps them to perform a function in which they seem 
to be deficient when left to their own unaided rationality devices 
based on the same information available to futures traders. 
Apparently, people need to see how futures’ traders aggregate 
“look ahead” information, and then they modify their asset trading 
behavior. In this sense, futures markets can serve as a specialized 
form of experiential aid to individual rationality. Thus, we learn 
that specialization is not just “limited by the extent of the market,” 
but is an integral part of that extension!   
  In the above examples of “confusion” it is natural to instruct 
or teach subjects more fully, and use tests to screen out those who 
do not reason as we do in order to be sure that we have people 
whose understanding of decision making corresponds to what we 
understand by it. This procedure is of merit: it enables us to verify 
whether we have identified a source of our explanatory error. 
Contrarily, the problem with this procedure is that it may insulate 
us from exploring how subjects think about the tasks we give them. 
In the asset market, VCM and declining pie environments, subjects 
get it right on their own with enough (or the right kind of) 
experience and it would be nice to know more about how that 
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process works. For example, suppose we tested people’s 
comprehension of the instructions, then compared the behavior of 
those who pass with those who fail in separate experiments.  
 What I think we have discovered is that backward induction 
is not a natural tool to use in human decision processes, and is very 
difficult to teach using pencil and paper exercises that people 
absorb, generalize as a principle and automatically apply to 
unfamiliar circumstances. Those of us who learned the backward 
induction principle long ago easily forget how difficult it was to 
internalize, and we can still fall into error. Perhaps many people 
explore an environment by making an accustomed move, observe 
the consequence, then in repeat play make whatever adjustment 
over time that seems to be sustainable and serve their interest in the 
same or sequences of different games.  This calls for caution in 
assuming that our subjects will come off the starting blocks in one-
shot games and get that socially complex and unfamiliar 
circumstance right.   
Theorists involved in the design of the FCC spectrum auction 
process did not use backward induction to examine their own 
auction proposals. Based on the idea that licenses had a common 
value for all bidders, English auction procedures were 
recommended since this allows the “given” dispersed private 
information on common value that bidders have collected to be 
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fully revealed at auction and a higher sale price obtained—an 
important static equilibrium theorem. But if that were true, so 
called “sophisticated” bidders using consultants would conclude, in 
the reality of an open planning environment, that they should 
invest nothing to acquire information that would be revealed later 
at auction. No information, no variation in estimated value to be 
revealed and the static theorem becomes vacuous. (Banks, et al 
2003) At the foundation of common value English auction theory 
there is degeneracy in the end game. The designers did not find it 
natural to look ahead and apply backward induction to their own 
design proposals.   
Actually, there are surely many theorems that hold only 
because the modeler limits the boundaries of what will be formally 
analyzed by “cutting the tree,” usually in the pursuit of tractability, 
with the desirable objective of simplifying and understanding the 
elements of a problem.13 Since such cognitive limitations must 
always be the forte of real people, this gives us a hint as to why full 
backward induction might be unnatural, and not worth the trouble, 
as a general principle of life to internalize. Of course this certainly 
does not deny that there are significant strategic interactions in 
which the parties to an interaction should or would conduct a 
careful analysis of their situation. The standard game-theoretic 
                                                 
13 Fifty years ago this was the common general equilibrium critique of all partial equilibrium analysis, but 
the latter has been resurrected with the explosion in applications of Nash’s work.  
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framework is surely a good thing to know if you already are 
reasonably certain that the players’ have access to its principles, 
including strictly opposed interests. But one of our principal tasks 
is to understand the home grown means by which subjects make 
decisions in every day human life, and their expression of that 
experience in the lab. There is time enough for us to teach certain 
principles in the classroom without assuming that they apply to the 
behavior of all economic agents. If that assumption were true we 
would have nothing to teach.  
4.2. Independence of history and future  
Assmption 2. In game theory an important conceptual 
distinction is made between a “stage” game played 
once, and a game in which two players engage in repeat 
play of the same such game. As experimentalists we 
have assumed in our implementation of this conceptual 
distinction, that subjects make choices in a (stage) game 
based on what we understand by it—a single play 
through a decision tree between ‘strangers’ that is 
devoid of a history and future.14  
                                                 
14 The procedures used to implement these single play conditions were pioneered by Siegel and Fouraker 
(1960) and Fouraker and Siegel (1963). Subjects were matched anonymously in a large sample for a single 
interactive play of a specified game, paid their earnings privately and separately, never to be matched 
again. Sid Siegel was a master of such technique. In the 1963 work the sample was large indeed: 106 
subjects participated in the five bilateral monopoly experiments; 291 participated in ten different oligopoly 
experiments (6 quantity adjuster and 4 price adjuster). Subjects were all randomized into treatments before 
they arrived at a session, and were notified a week in advance of the night they were scheduled to appear 
for a session. (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, p 22, 114-115)    
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We do not have good evidence that this proposition is valid. 
We have known at least since Fouraker and Siegel (1963) that 
subjects behave differently in repeat play than in single play. But 
this tells you only that reputation building is more important in 
repeat play of the same game than in single play, not that it is 
absent in one-shot games, or that it is not important in sequences of 
different stage games each played once with the same or distinct 
partners. Hence, the question—Do subjects choose in stage games 
as if they understand what we understand?—is not answered by 
saying that subjects know the difference between a one-shot game 
and a repeated game. Of course they play differently, but I am 
talking about the one-shot base line, and whether it is devoid of 
reputation considerations in play across the games people 
experience in the world (or in the lab), whether the “same” game is 
repeated or not.15  
The problem with assumption 2 is revealed when you 
contemplate the agony of attempts to banish a history and a future 
in the matching protocols:  
a. Random re-matching of pairs in a finite sample was of 
course inadequate; 
                                                 
15 At Arizona, in the late 1980’s and 90’s, I and my coauthors conducted a large number of two person 
game experiments. These were spread over many semesters, and we commonly recruited from the subject 
data bank pool only those (mostly new additions to the pool) who had not been in previous such two person 
experiments. Thus did we seek to control for “history” in the sense of experimental play—a huge 
challenge.     
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b. Or, let every subject play every other exactly once; this is 
judged inadequate because of contagion: no one must play 
anyone who played with someone you played earlier.  
c. If you have each person play their matched counterpart in 
the population exactly once you encounter the problem 
that you have to have large N to get large samples. But 
large N collides with the finding that trusting behavior 
declines significantly in a trust game when group size is 
increased. (Burnham et al, 2000). Hence, you have to have 
large N overall, and hold constant the smaller number who 
are present in a given location. But these two conditions 
juxtaposed may strain credibility with the subjects. 
d. As in footnotes 17 and 18, one recruits from pools that are 
inexperienced in previous two-person game experiments.   
All this is mind-boggling. Moreover, we still do not know 
what this means for how the brains of our subjects process 
elaborate matching protocols. Yet different protocols commonly 
generate differences in observed behavior. The bottom line appears 
to be that the abstract concept of single play invokes conditions 
sufficiently remote from much human experience that it may be 
operationally difficult to penetrate.              
In single play dictator, investment trust and trust games, the 
results are affected by double blind treatments that are difficult to 
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reconcile with postulate 2 if these games are correctly portrayed as 
representing single isolated play. Context and third party 
knowledge reflect characteristics of subject sociality in a world of 
repeat play that seems to import a history and/or a future in spite of 
player anonymity.  
An important example illustrating how easily procedures can 
introduce a future is found by comparing dictator game results 
reported by Cox: in one (Cox, 2004), the amount given is 36.3% of 
the stakes; in the other (Cox, 2000), dictators give 51.8%.16 The 
difference between these two sets of observations is attributable to 
a single difference in the procedures: the larger amount is 
transferred when subjects are informed that a second undefined 
Task 2 will follow the first, and after they have completed the first 
they will receive instructions about the second. Hence, it appears 
that any suggestion of a “future,” even if undefined, and otherwise 
thought to be “independent,” substantially increases giving—an 
important sensitivity finding.  
From the perspective of the subjects, however, the dictator 
game task must seem strange. You are recruited to the lab, 
awarded a costless right to some of the experimenter’s money, and 
given an opportunity to transfer any part or none of it to a second 
anonymous person who has nothing to do except receive the 
                                                 
16 The reported levels of dictator giving are higher than in the standard dictator game in these treatments 
because the transfers are tripled. This treatment allows the results to be compared with giving in the 
investment trust game; Berg et al, 1995. 
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money. (It is not the standard interactive game in which payoffs 
jointly depend on the decisions of both players). “The God’s must 
be crazy!” But if there is a second task to follow, perhaps it is not 
so crazy; is it better to give in case there will be a subsequent 
return on your generosity?        
Just because people cannot be relied upon to backward induct 
with mindful rationally, does not mean that their socially 
conditioned autonomic brains are oblivious to all considerations or 
hints of a future, especially it seems, in the case of the dictator 
game. I think these results are significant in hinting as to how 
geared subject brains are to be cognizant (if unconsciously) of 
building valuable reputations in the repeat interactions of daily 
life—considerations that it would be convenient to believe are 
fully controlled in the single play of a stage game between 
anonymous pairs of subjects.   
When a subject faces a task choice in a one-shot game what 
is her homeostatic “set point?”  (Camerer et al., 2005) How safe 
are we in assuming that the set point corresponds to the 
experimentalist/theorist definition: a single interaction between 
strangers in which the players take no account of reputation issues? 
How is that set point affected by circumstances and history? 
Suppose a person’s accustomed behavioral mode is to try 
cooperation in most or all first encounters, because this seems to 
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have had long term benefits, and to modify it only when it is 
discovered to ill serve her in a particular situation. Then when 
matched by the gods with another like person, this “set point” will 
earn her more money than if she always acted according to 
assumption 2. 
This interpretation is consistent with trust game data reported 
by Rigdon, et al (2007) in which subjects are allocated randomly 
between two repeat play treatments: in the control each trial 
rematches subjects in pairs at random; in the research treatment 
subjects are rank ordered on each trial by frequency of historical 
cooperation over the previous five decision trials, and then 
matched according to these “trust” and “trustworthy” scores. 
Subjects are not informed of the scoring or matching rules, and in 
both treatments are informed only that on each trial they will be 
paired with another individual. How do people respond in 
discovering through experience that they are in more, compared 
with less, cooperative behavioral environments? Any person with a 
cooperative “set point” in the research treatment is more likely to 
be matched with another such person on any trial; potentially both 
earn a higher payoff and, compared with the control, there is an 
unannounced reinforcement for cooperation to build over time. 
Alternatively, a subject discovering that he or she is in an 
environment of cooperation may feel they can profit even more by 
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defecting. Hence, cooperation could build, decay or be 
indistinguishable from the control, depending on how subjects 
respond to their experience in the treatment condition.17 From the 
first block of trials, 1-5, to the last, 15-20, the ratio of percent 
cooperation in the sorting treatment to the random control 
increases by 100% for Players 1 (“trust”), and by 50% for Players 
2 (“trustworthy”).      
In game theory, utility for the individual is the utility from 
his current choice, si, in the stage game, (1- d) ui(s) + dVi(H(s)), 
where s = (s1,…si,…sn) for n players, d is a discount factor, H is 
the history of play, and dVi(H) is i’s endogenous discounted value 
of continuation. In the standard theoretical argument, if the game is 
repeated, it means that the individual has incentive to forgo 
currently choosing dominance to avoid spoiling his future, and use 
the interactive opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial 
exchange relationship over time. (See Sobel, 2005). If the same 
game is not repeated with the same person (n=2 in our 
experiments), there is no “history,” and by hypothesis the 
continuation value is assumed to be identically zero—a stark 
contrast with repetition. But why should a real person see no 
continuation value across stage games with different but culturally 
                                                 
17 It is straight forward to model the case in which a small population of cooperators can invade a 
population of defectors through mutual recognition and deliberately engaging in forms of positive 
reciprocity. But Rigdon et al (2007) hypothesized that many people have instinctive cooperative tendencies 
that are non-deliberative and invoked in response to what they experience.    
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more or less similar strangers? Can we ignore the fact that each 
person shares cultural elements of commonality with the history of 
others? Why is H(s) in actual human experience derived only from 
play of the same game with the same person? Is not culture about 
multilateral human sociality? These empirical extra theoretical 
questions critically affect how we interpret single play 
observations.  
4.3. Complete information and dominance 
Assumption 3. Subjects have complete information on own 
and other payoff. 
Assumption 4. Domination. Given a choice between any two 
amounts of money, subjects always choose the larger amount 
whatever the circumstances. 
In same-pair repeated games domination yields good 
predictions when subjects are matched anonymously with private 
information, but not under complete information.18 (McCabe, et al, 
1996, 1998). Private information is also the condition under which 
market equilibrium theory yields good predictions. Hence, it 
appears that across all interactive situations, repeat play and 
private information are the conditions under which equilibrium 
theory is very effective in organizing our observations. In two-
person interactions such replicable experimental results motivated 
                                                 
18 The recording of such cooperation has become famously commonplace going back decades to the earliest 
experimental games. (See e.g., Fouraker and Siegel, 1963) 
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the theorems in Kalai and Lehrer (1993) which capture the 
phenomenon of convergence but do not address or predict the 
properties of its dynamic path. This is an important empirical 
victory for economic/game theory. Where game theory fails to 
predict well is in the much less realistic case in which the cash 
value of outcomes to other(s) as well as self is known perfectly.   
Domination has been thought to have failed decisively in 
many complete information games, and many have invoked social 
preference explanations and tests. (See the discussion and 
references in Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). But this explanation is 
only justified if we know that our other assumptions are not 
violated. Thus, if some do not backward induct or do not choose as 
if mindful of the meaning of single play (Vi(H(s)) = 0), we cannot 
be secure in our preference conclusions. I am not claiming that 
there is no room for social preferences, only that the common 
approach is to impose that interpretation by implicitly 
assuming/believing that our test frameworks control for all the 
assumptions of game theory that may result in cooperative choices, 
except domination.    
4.4. Folk theorem 
Assumption 5. Repeat play of a stage game favors 
cooperation because in “long” games subjects can rationally use 
punishment to induce domination opponents to play cooperatively.  
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Table 1 compares two trust games, each using repeat play 
with the same pairs: one in which defection can be punished 
directly at a cost in the sub game containing the cooperative 
outcome; the other in which defection can only be punished on the 
next round by playing the sub game containing the equilibrium. 
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Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on McCabe et al 1996, Tables 6 and 7   
 
 
 
  Frequency Percent Cooperation Conditional  
on Play in Cooperative Subgame  
  Treatment 
  Trial Block 
Trust, no Direct
Punishment 
Trust with Direct 
Punishment 
1-5 64.4 82.1 
6-10 84.6 86.4 
11-15 89.0 92.6 
16-20 91.0 91.4 
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The prospect of costly direct punishment increases the 
frequency of conditional cooperation compared with the indirect 
punishment case, but over time the game with the indirect 
punishment option (asymptotically in the average) approaches the 
frequency of cooperation in the game with direct punishment.  
Hence, in this example, the Folk Theorem has validity both when 
people have to devise their own forms of punishment in repetition, 
and when it is provided for them directly in the decision tree. 
Moreover this convergence to cooperation emerges “quickly”—
within 20 trials—so well practiced it would appear are most 
subjects in their cultures of repeat social interaction. In this case a 
relatively small nine percent get locked into non cooperative play 
in the last trial block. 
In repetition of the same game, people deviate from their 
initial choice as they discover, along with their paired counterpart, 
strategies that improve on that initial outcome. Empirically, Houser 
has shown that subjects can be usefully “Typed” by their initial 
round-one choice, a characteristic which continues to have 
significant predictive power across individuals even as they adapt 
to different treatment circumstances in dynamic play over time in 
various two-person trust game environments.  (See for example, 
Houser, 2003) Do these “types” define social preferences? Perhaps 
they do, but the problem with invoking other regarding utility is 
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that it is confounded with the observation that such “types” have 
been observed to reap larger average individual rewards in both 
single and repeat play by choosing cooperatively. For example, we 
have reported single play trust game data comparing faculty with 
undergraduates. (Coricelli, McCabe and Smith, 2000). The 
undergraduates take substantially less time to choose at each 
decision node than the faculty and earn higher average monetary 
rewards because they cooperate more. Are we to judge the 
undergraduates to be irrational? Strange, that faculty require more 
time for an analysis that one expects to be quick and easy for 
sophisticated players. What in their brains are giving them pause in 
this straight forward application of game theoretic reasoning?  
 Consider again the trust games with and without a direct 
punishment option for defection on offers to cooperate: across all 
single play and repeat play matching protocols, average earnings 
from cooperative play never fall below sub game equilibrium 
earnings. In all but single play in the pure trust game people 
offering to cooperate make more money on average than if they 
played non-cooperatively. This is shown in Table 2.   
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Table 2 
 
 
Average Earnings per trial for Players 
Offering to Cooperate: Non Cooperative 
Equilibrium earnings = 40.0; Cooperative 
earnings = 50.0 
Treatment 
Protocol 
Trust; no 
Direct 
Punishment 
Trust with 
Direct 
Punishment 
Single play 40.0 46.2 
Repeat 
Single 
NA 41.5 
Same 
Pairing, 
repeat play 
46.9 46.6 
Random 
pairing, 
repeat play 
41.2 40.7 
 
     From McCabe et al, 1996, Table 4.  
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In the lab we offer people choices in a single isolated stage 
game; is that circumstance isolated from the person’s social 
history? Have subjects’ brains encoded experience from isolated 
single play games, or from sequential mixtures of single play 
games, repeated games, games that are repeated conditional on the 
outcome, and games in which it is not clear who was the first or 
second mover. In life whether a game is repeated or not may 
depend on the outcome of the initial encounter, and is not neatly 
defined in advance as assumed in theory and implemented by 
instructions; rather games are defined only by past and continuing 
experience. The “isolated” game is an abstract construct. It is 
conceptually very important to make these distinctions when we 
are engaged in closet theorizing, as mental control experiments, 
but this does not mean that subjects’ brains, or even our brains, 
encode these distinctions as part of our autobiographical 
experiential knowledge.  
4.5 Context irrelevance                       
Assumption 6. Context does not matter, only the underlying 
abstract game structure.  
 Perhaps the most useful learning from ultimatum and dictator 
games has been in demonstrating the power of context—
instructions and procedures—to shift decisions significantly and 
measurably as much as cultural and information treatments. In 
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ultimatum games the data can be shifted from 44.1% offered to 
27.8% offered. (Hoffman et al, 1994) Similar context effects 
appear in dictator and trust games. As indicated previously, in trust 
games words like “opponent,” “partner” and “counterpart” are 
associated with different patterns of play over time. And beware 
always of inadvertently creating an in-group or out-group “set 
point” context or any slight hint of a future interaction in dictator 
games.  
Context variation may include an allegedly benign expansion 
of the decision space to include “cheap talk.” Thus, ultimatum 
games do not permit responders to express their concern 
(displeasure, emotion)—I am going to call it “disagreement” 
(Wilson, 2007)—with the terms of the proposer’s offer, except by 
rejecting the offer. Houser and Xiao (2005) study ultimatum games 
in which the responder, in addition to deciding whether to accept 
or reject the offer, has the opportunity to send any freely composed 
written message to the proposer. In the baseline experiments in 
which no auxiliary message can be sent—only “accept” or 
“reject"—12 of 20 (60%) of the offers of $4 or less (the stakes are 
$20) are rejected by the responders. In the comparison experiments 
where an auxiliary message can be sent, 6 of 9 (32%) of the offers 
of $4 or less are rejected. The contents of the messages in the latter 
case clearly vent negative emotions toward the proposer, and 
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appear to provide a low cost communication of strong 
disagreement that relieves half the responders from incurring the 
high cost of rejection. This behavior cannot be understood 
rationally in single play games, but it can be understood in the 
experiential history of ongoing interactive social context, where 
people can credibly express their disagreement and expectation 
failure short of taking precipitate actions—an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth—that will spoil continuation and the prospect of 
an improved future. Why should we suppose that such histories are 
made irrelevant by our careful attempt to create the conditions we 
think should be sufficient for one-shot play?             
And why are so many dimensions of context significant 
treatments in determining action? Following Hume (1739; 1985) 
we would say that each context defines elements in the rich set of 
circumstances other than explicit payoff motivation. I suggest that 
when people walk into an unfamiliar situation they bring a brain 
encoded with categories generated from the relative frequency of 
exposure to discrete past experiences in life. (See Hayek, 1952) 
Based on the instructions and procedures, people search that data 
bank for personal knowledge relevant to the task they face and 
then choose an action according to their motivation. Under this 
hypothesis, each subject’s personal autobiographical knowledge is 
filtered by contextual circumstances for relevance to the decision 
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at hand. This conjunction determines the person’s “set point,” in 
which personal knowledge also appears to reflect important life 
style characteristics derived from the human career of sociality.  
 
4.6. Equivalence of the standard game forms. 
Assumption 7. The two standard game forms—extensive and 
normal—are equivalent.  
Long ago Schelling (1960) made cogent arguments that one 
should not expect the two game forms to be equivalent. Schelling’s 
main tool was not game theory, but ordinary common sense in 
thinking through how experience and circumstances might 
reasonably influence how individuals behave. There are now many 
experimental studies falsifying the equivalence hypothesis in a 
variety of different games. (Schotter et al, 1994, Rapoport, 1997, 
McCabe, et al 2000).  
The latter argue that the important principle that allows 
better coordination “derives from the human capacity to read 
another person’s thoughts or intentions by placing themselves 
in the position and information state of the other person.”19 
(McCabe et al, 2000, p. 4404). Such “mind reading” to detect 
intentions underlies reciprocity in extensive form games. 
This interpretation has found support in the brain imaging 
                                                 
19 This is also central to the idea in Schelling (1960) that focal points facilitate coordination. 
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study reported by McCabe et al (2001). It was indicated 250 
years ago by Adam Smith: “As we have no immediate 
experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of 
the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving 
what we ourselves would feel in a like situation.” (Smith, 
1759/1982, p. 9). Krueger et al (2007) report that in repeat 
play of trust games activation of the intention detecting 
modules (paracingulate cortex) occurs in the trust building 
phase for those choosing to trust unconditionally. In the 
maintenance phase activation is relegated to older brain 
modules (septal) as the interaction becomes routine and 
people settle into reciprocal coordination on the cooperative 
outcome. As Polanyi (1962) would say, what begins as “focal 
awareness” soon becomes an automatic part of our 
“subsidiary awareness.” Focal awareness places larger 
demands on the brain’s resources for reading intentionality, 
and it seems that our brains long ago evolved mechanisms to 
economize on those resources.    
These results and that of others cited above imply that the 
extensive and normal forms are not played as if they were the same 
games. Players use moves to read and signal intentions that are not 
the same when actually experienced in sequential move form as 
Page 40 of 55
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 40
when imagined in a mental experiment corresponding to the same 
sequence, but expressed in the normal form.  
Cooper and Van Huyck (2003) draw a similar conclusion. In 
particular they suggest that players in the first position in their 
games are motivated to choose moves that include the second 
player in the decision process, and thus invite the ready 
development of a relationship.  I think this readiness to develop a 
relationship in stage games hints strongly as to why subjects who 
are not dominance players (Tables 1 and 2) are able conditionally, 
in some games, to reach more profitable cooperative outcomes in 
repeat play with the same pairs.     
4.7 Own versus other people’s money. 
Assumption 8. Monetary payoffs matter, but not who provides the 
money or how people acquired the stakes: there is no OPM (other 
people’s money) problem.   
 
In dictator games, Cherry et al (2002) have demonstrated that 
this implicit (and traditionally unexamined) assumption is false. 
Although larger stakes increase altruism somewhat, the results are 
dominated by whether the money was a freebie from the 
experimenter or earned, and is significantly further influenced by 
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whether third parties (single vs double blind) can know and 
identify individual actions.20 This is shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
20 It seems that Hoffman et al (1994) did not go far enough in requiring only that subjects earn the right to 
the first mover position. 
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Table 3 
 
Percent Dictators Giving Nothing 
 
Treatment 
$10 
Stakes
$40 
Stakes
Single Blind; 
Experimenter Gives 
Endowments 
  19%  15% 
Single Blind; DMs 
Earn Endowments 
  79%  70% 
Double Blind; DMs 
Earn Endowments 
  95%  97% 
 
Based on Cherry et al, 2002. 
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 Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008 have further examined the 
robustness of these results—100% of their dictators give nothing.    
Consequently, there is a substantial difference between how 
people allocate experimenter supplied endowments between own 
and other use and how they allocate money that they have earned 
from the experimenter based on pre game task performance. After 
all it is rare to see people walking around in the streets giving 
small amounts of their money to anonymous strangers. The data 
appears to send an important message: as experimenters we have 
learned a lot about behavior in two person games using OPM, and 
have used such findings to fit mixtures of own and other 
preferences to the data, but these findings may perhaps tell us little 
about people’s behavior when using their own money. There is a 
large literature interpreting behavior as due to “fairness” in games 
using the experimenter’s money, but how “fair” are people with 
their own money? Cherry et al 2002 and Oxoby and Spraggon, 
2008, suggest that in the dictator game, at least, some 0 to 3% of 
them are “fair” after passing through a procedure that legitimizes 
the funds as their own property. The bad news here is that it seems 
that some of us may have spent a lot of time, money and effort on a 
special case that does not seem to generalize. But our knowledge is 
growing and the good news is that much new learning—pro or 
con—is likely as all the old questions concerning dominance vs 
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social preferences must be asked yet again using various 
procedures for implementing decision when people use their own 
or earned money. The theorist’s work is from sun to sun, but the 
experimenters work is never done. What we do not know, as yet, is 
the extent to which this variation in dictator results extends to other 
games. In this exploration we have to proceed on a case by case 
basis.21        
 
5. Closure 
Game theory does not predict when and where its principles 
can be applied except through the filter of our judgments as to the 
validity of its assumptions in our test environments. How sensitive 
are our test conclusions to the assumptions 1-8? How do we come 
to know their separate validity given the ambiguity of composite 
tests and the challenge of creating more precise tests? The 
maintained assumption of game theory is that the players’ interests 
are in opposition, but the theory relies on extra theoretical 
knowledge of when this is the case. Hence, the impromptu ex post 
complaints, when experiments produce unpredicted results, that the 
stakes or subject sophistication “must have been” too low—
conditions that were not explicit in the original theory but were 
quickly invoked after seeing the anomalous test results.  
                                                 
21 Thus, Schwartz and Ang (1989) found that asset bubbles were observed when subjects were required to 
bring their own $20 endowment (OPM being a possible explanation of bubbles). Alternatively, Cherry et al 
(2005) found no strong OPM effects in VCM games.      
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As experimentalists we have come to the realization that 
people’s decisions, consistent with their cultural experience, are 
often as sensitive to the specific context as to variation in the 
structure of the game. That is how brains work. An understandable 
fault we share is the error of thinking too much like economists 
and game theorists when interpreting the decision choices of our 
subjects. The standard game-theoretic assumptions are an 
important generator of precise theorems, but this desirable property 
should never be confused with the precision of the tests the 
theorems motivate. Modeling skill is essential when constructing 
abstract first-cut representations of socioeconomic systems and 
their underlying function. Moreover, these representations are 
often accurate predictors of  the outcomes we observe—as in 
markets, various auction institutions and in two-person games 
under private information—but those skills fail to enable us to see 
how and why people who do not have our professional expertise, 
can or cannot reach our predicted outcomes across the spectrum of 
games we study. 
 In two-person games of complete payoff information, one of 
our tasks in coming to terms with experimental observations is to 
reexamine our nearly universal procedure of serving as the third 
party provider of the resources that motivate the decisions we 
observe. We cannot assume without evidence that this particular 
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circumstance does not qualify the interpretation of our results in 
the games we study. The dictator investigations have shown that 
these circumstances matter.22 This is not to say that the focus on 
OPM is irrelevant, only incomplete. Both government and private 
organizations are commonly engaged in the allocation of resources 
supplied by others, but this is not the framework from which 
traditional economic and game theoretic principles arose.   
In thinking about how we can better understand these issues, I 
want to suggest first that we ask of any of our experiment designs 
the following question: how would we conduct them if people 
brought (or otherwise provided) their own money? Secondly, we 
need to move past the narrow confines of a theoretical perspective 
that emphasizes games of pure distribution, particularly games of 
redistribution of the experimenter’s money.  
The important property of an economy is its capacity to 
generate wealth from the specialization that is made possible 
through exchange (or other forms and norms of sharing the fruits 
of specialization). Game theory and its application in experiments 
takes as given that a game can be nonzero sum, but does not ask 
why or how these circumstances might occur and how they might 
effect the perceptions and motivation of the participants. Here is 
                                                 
22 In the original investment trust game Berg et al (1995) required the Player 1 investors to decide how 
much of their $10 show up fee to send to (invest in) Player 2, suggesting that the authors were already 
thinking in terms of conveying a sense that the funds were the subjects’ own. But the circumstances 
defining alternative sources of funding for the participants in trust games is yet to be systematically 
investigated.   
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simply one illustration of how these circumstances might be 
modified in standard experiments:   
In the ultimatum game the experimenter uses some procedure 
for awarding money to A but his right to it is conditional on B’s 
agreement to the share offered by A; the dictator game removes 
B’s right of veto. Anyone who brought their own money to 
these experiments would surely elect not to play either game, as 
they are games of pure redistribution of the money brought to 
the table. (It would be judged “unfair” in the Anglo sense.) I am 
reminded of Ellsberg’s insightful paper on zero sum game 
theory, a theory launched by the matching of reluctant dualists 
when viewed within a larger opportunity space (Ellsberg, 1956).  
We could give the constant positive sum ultimatum game 
economic content as follows: Each player provides $M of his 
own money. Some procedure is used for pairing the subjects, 
and determining who is to be Player 1 and who Player 2; this 
procedure in some variations might incorporate an earned 
and/or investment feature. It is understood that their pairing has 
economic significance in the sense that there are synergistic 
gains from the interaction equal to some fixed sum y > 2M. The 
experimenter provides only the surplus above 2M which 
represents the gains from specialization and exchange, as this is 
the one reliable source of a “free lunch” that converts economic 
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systems into non-zero sum games. Hence, the total to be shared 
under the property right rules of the game is 2M + y, making it 
feasible for each to receive a share of the jointly created net gain 
above their pooled initial contribution, 2M.  
In summary I think there is a sense in which the state of 
experimental economics is comparable to the description of 
knowledge in physics a century ago: “The mass of insufficiently 
connected experimental data was overwhelming…” (Einstein, 
1949, p 17). Hume (1739; 1985) points to an important source of 
unexplained variability in our data, the “circumstances unknown to 
us” in the expression of behavior; clues to the source of that 
variability, however, are often revealed whenever we probe some 
of the explicit or implicit premises of game theory and our 
empirical implementations of the theory.  
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